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ERVING GO FFMAN S FRAME ANALYSIS IN RELAT I ON TO 
MODERN 	 CRO—SOC I OLOG I CAL FARAD' GMS*  
Jef VERHOEVEN 
Few contemporary sociologists are as creative as Erving Goffman. 
One product of this creativity is frame analysis (Goffman, 1974), a 
method that is both admired and neglected. Comparing Goffman's approach 
to other paradigms seems not only to be a negation of the creativity of 
this writer, but is strongly disliked by Goffman (1931b) when such 
comparisons have nothing but labeling as their purpose. It is not the 
function of this paper to place frame analysis in one or another 
theoretical pigeon hole. Frame analysis is a sociological approach in 
its own right. Nevertheless, Goffman accepts different standpoints of 
symbolic interaction (G.H. Meed) ethnomethodology and phenomenological 
sociology (A. Schutz) even when he denies others. I intend here to 
present the differences and similarities between Goffman's frame 
analysis on the one hand, and Blumer's symbolic interaction, Schutz' 
phenomenological sociology, and Garfinkel's ethnomethodology on the 
other hand in function of three questions: 
1. What are the presuppositions in relation to reality, knowledge, man 
and society used in the four paradigms? 
2. What is the object of sociology? 
3. What are the methodological principles? 
Moreover I want to show that in spite of different ascents, the frame-
analysis approach already can be found in the earlier work of Goffman. 
Something must be said about why these four micro-sociologica) 
paradigms have been selected. First, Goffman, although sometimes 
leaning toward the ideas of Schutz, Mead, and Garfinkel, presents his 
work as different from theirs. Instead of Using Mead's work in this 
paper, I will use Blumer's (1969) seminal book, because of its major 
influence en symbolic interactionism. (1) Second, they try to give an 
analysis of the 'ongoing activity' as it appears 'here and now' and are 
interested in the interpretation of reality. Third, although three of 
them do not limit their interest to the study of micro-structures, all 
start by studying face-to-face relations. Fourth, there is a relation-
ship between Goffman's frame as 'the organization of experience', 'the 
definition of the situation' as used in symbolic interactionism, the 
phenomenological 'meaning contexts' and ethnomethodological 'indexical-
ity' and Treflexivityl. Fifth, frame analysis is considered to be a 
forma) sociology (Jameson, 1976), a symbolic interactionist approach 
(Littlejohn, 1977; Glaser", 1976), ethnomethodological and semiotic 
(Jameson, 1976), and structuralist (Gonos, 1971). Here, frame analysis 
will be considered as a special approach and cannot be forced into one 
of these categories. 
3. 
FRAME ANALYSIS IN THE OTHER WORKS OF GOFFMAN 
Let us first eiamine the eitent to which the frame analysis 
approach is present in Goffman's other works. Although he devotes a 
great deal of attention to a socio—psychological problem formulation, 
the structures within which the actors move and via which they approach 
reality from a substantie' portion of his earlier work. Where does one 
find evidence for this thesis? 
Already in The Presentation of Self in Everjday Life (1959), 
Goffman wonders what techniques actors use to give others a specific 
impression of themselves or of a situation. Instead of 'techniques', 
one could just as welf use the term 'frame' here ('framework of 
appearances', Goffman, 1959: 242). These frameworks are outlined in 
detail in this book and concur with Chose of Frame Analysis. However, 
Goffman stil' talks in this first book about the dramaturgic 
presentation of an activity. Used in this approach (Goffman, 1959: 8, 
17, 107, 112, 70, 175, 176, 141) are terms such as 'concealment, 
discovery', 'performance', 'front region', 'backstage', 'fabricators', 
'staging talk', 'team collusion', and 'secrets'. 
The anthology, Interaction Ritual (1967), of which four articles 
had originally appeared before 1959, also deals with similer problems. 
Goffman bases himself here on the study of the social 'gathering', a 
collection of people who meet each other sup.erficially at the same plece 
and shortly thereafter leave that pace. At that moment, the members of 
this gathering try to disclose their appearance in a particular way, the 
facie' expression being an important instrument. Goffman (1967: 77) 
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studies how one can hide or betray his facial expression, what ritual is 
used, and what attitude is adopted or how we behave in order to leed or 
misleed the other. The offering of a chair to a visitor, for example, 
is an expression of deference. Its meaning can be changed, however, 
should one do it brusquely (tdemeanor') (Goffman, 1967: 81). 
Further, he studies within what frames 'embarrassment' occurs among 
the actors and what forms of alienation of a situation can be 
distinguished (Goffman, 1967: 97 ff., 117 ff.). In the longgist article, 
'Where the Action Is', finally, a keen analysis is given of the 'action' 
that can be found in the world of gambling, card playing, and sports, 
This is a particular form of action: the actor takes risks that flow 
from the situation but that actually can be avoided. Goffman studies 
here the structures within which the. 'action' takes place. 
Encounters (1961a) gives the structure in which tabla games take 
form (1 Fun in Games'), and how an individual can distance himself from 
the rale he has to play ('Role distante'). Here, too, the theme of the 
first bonk recurs, namely, what the individual wants to manifest of 
himself to the other. Much attention is devoted to the frames that make 
this possible and that will refer to his descriptions in Frame Analysis. 
This problem can also be found in Asylums (1961b) and Stigma 
(1963a): What frames are used there to evaluate the behavior of patients 
in a psychiatrie hospita' and of people who are stigmatized? Goffman 
(1961b: 283, 331), describes how the structure within which the 
psychiatrie patient and the stigmatized individual act provides the 
frames in order to see the social reality in a well-determined manner. 
In Behavior in Public Places (1963b), the face—to—face behavior of 
people in the daily circumstances of the gathering is again centrale 
This behavior must be seen within the situation where the gathering 
takes place. This means that the astor takes account of the spatial 
environment into which he steps in order to become part of a gathering 
(Goffman, 1963b: 18). The typical characteristics of these situations 
impose differing norm on the astors: for example, how one has to 
manifest his familiarity or unfamiliarity with someone and where the 
limits of this behavior lie (Goffman, 1963b: 112 ff.). A number of 
frames of Frame Analysis are also found here already, such as 'talking 
to oneself', 'delusionary stater', 'open regions', 'concealment' and 
'boundary collusion' (Goffman, 1963b: 72, 75, 132, 176, 181). 
Strategic Interaction (1969) consists of two important essays. The 
first is entitled 'Expression Games', and Goffman here searches for the 
conditions under which an individual receives, gives, or bides 
information. For in the encounter with the other, there is always doubt 
over what the other really means; it is a kind of game situation in 
which one tries to find out what the other really wants to express. The 
standpoint is formeel by the simpte moves of the other that one tries to 
understand (Goffman, 1969: 11), for they are applied by the other to 
present the reality in a particular manner. Frames as concealment and 
fabrication form essential components of these expression games 
(Goffman, 1969: 28, 58, 80). The same can be said about the second 
essay, which baars the same title as the book: 'Strategic Interaction'. 
Here, too, 'keying' (Goffman, 1969: 115, 116, 140), 'frame analysis', 
'concealment', and the like are mentioned. These frames are used by 
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Goffman to apply a game theory analysis to the study of strategic 
interaction. In a strategic interaction, two partjes meet each other in 
a welf-structured situation. Each party tries to find out what the 
other party thinks about him. In this way, one tries to foresee what 
movement the other party will make in order to adept one's own 
movements. Goffman studies further what frames are used to make 
possible and to hinder this strategic interaction. 
Finally, frame analysis is not absent from Relations in Public  
(1971). The object of the research is the face-to-face behavior in 
daily life: Goffman wants to give a picture of the ground rules and the 
behavioral patterns of public life. Via the study of these ground 
rules, he again arrives at the frames that help the actors to read the 
reality. The menner in which an individual appears in the world and the 
territory of the self only become comprehensible through the frames 
used. Tims, for example, one uses signs to define one's territory 
(Goffman, 1971: 41), but it can also be removed when one fouls it 
oneself or when others succeed in penetrating it (Goffman, 1971: 52, 
57). Brief encounters of people with each other consist of a 
'supportive' and 'remedial interchange'. This exchange is a kind of 
ritual that confirms the relations between the actors ar reroutes on a 
goed path these that threaten to become conflictuil. Ritual also plays 
an important role in the signs that are used to clarify our bond with 
others. All these elements allow the reality to be read as normai or 
abnormal. The entire series of frames from Frame Analysis is already 
provided in Relations in Pubic (1971: 113, 140, 211, 269, 284, 314, 
etc.). 
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In Gender Advertisements (1976) and Forms of Talk (1981a), Goffman 
very definitely applies the frame analysis approach. These two works 
were, in fact, published after Frame Analysis. The first work concerns 
the manner in which people manifest their sexual identity to the others 
and how this is used in the world of advertising. Goffman does this by 
means of a long series of advertising photographs, and explains what 
frames we use to interpret theet (Goffman, 1976: 10-23). The second work 
deals with linguistic usage and consists of articles that were written 
between 1974 and 1980. The frame analysis approach is here applied to 
the very simpte forms of discussion, response cries, and also to ways of 
speaking, lectures, and radio talk. Part of this problem is already 
discuseed in Frame Analysis (1974: 496-559). 
In conclusion, one may state that the frame analysis problem 
formulation is a constant motif throughout all of Goffman's work. Of 
course, it is not so significant in his earlier work as in Frame 
Analysis and in his later work. Nevertheless, in one way or another, 
Goffman is always looking for the frames that we use in order to answer 
the question of 'what is it that is going en here?' The result is an 
unmasking of a socially concealed world. But, in additieri, a world 
becomes visible that is established in its smallest details. This will 
now be examined further. 
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THE WORLD PICTURE 
Research cannot be understood apart from the world picture of the 
researcher (Strasser, 1973; Radnitzki, 1970). This world picture is 
crucial and gives the researcher a particular image of man and society 
and the relation between bath. The researcher will choose a particular 
research program in function of this view. So the social world can be 
considered as a material reality in which different impersonal powers 
react upon the material components. There are also sociologists who 
consider the social world as peopled by individuals creating meaning and 
reacting upon each other. Both exemplar points of view are applied in 
sociology and are considered useful for the understanding of social 
reality in function of the world picture practiced by the sociologists. 
World pictures are thus presuppositions about physical reality, man, and 
society (Radnitzky, 1970: XXVIII). Aithough these hypotheses are of a 
metaphysical order, they have a major influence on the research and 
methods of sociologists. 
What are the world pictures of frame analysis, symbolic interactio—
nism, phenomenological sociology, and ethnomethodology? 
REALITY 
Goffman (1974, 10) uses a rather atnbiguous concept of reality. 
This is clear in his dsfinition of the term 'strip': 
The term 'strip' will be used to refer to any arbitrary slice or 
cut from the stream of ongoing activity, including here sequences 
of happenings, reel or fictive, as seen from the perspective of 
those subjectively involved in sustaining en interest in theet. 
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Three points must be considered. In the first place, Goffman 
spaaks of 'real or fictive sequences of happening', but both can be 
reel. 	
'h 
Actions framed ettirely in terms of a primary framework are said to 
be real or actual, to be really or actually or literally occurring 
(Goffman, 1974: 47). 
But even when these actions_ are keyed, i.e. transposed into another 
frame, it does not mean that these actions are not real. Indeed, the 
keying actually .occurs. What is considered as real depends on the 
perspective, either primary or transformed, from which actions ae.e 
considered by the actor. 
Reality always appears to the actor from a particular perspective. 
This perspective is Biven by the frames we use, which frames are seen as 
particular organizations of experience. In a certain sense, we can put 
that reality into a construction by the actors, taking into account 
franing, keying, and fabrication (i.e. the creation of a 'false belief 
about what it is that is going on'). But Goffman stresses that it would 
be ridiculous to say that reality is totally created by the actors: 
reality is also pre-Biven. It is not sufficient to define something as 
a parking place if there is no place at all. 
Thisposition is not a break with Goffman's position in his 
earlier books. Although he gives a very important place to the idea of 
the 'definition of the situation', an idealistic stance toward reality, 
he is aware of the fact that reality is outside the individual's mind. 
In view of the description of encounters, this idea becomes clear 
(Goffman, 1961a: 27-28). Encounters characteristically produce direct 
interaction between the participants of the encounters. This does not 
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imply that these participants create the total reality. Indeed, inter—
actions take place in a particular historical sequence, which means that 
there is already a meaning given to this reality. Moreover, there are 
unintended acts that are part of the encounter without constituting the 
main parts of the encounter, e.g. coughing and sniffling. How unimpor—
tent they seem to be, they are part of reality, which is out there. 
Third, this perspective on activity is formulated by the individ—
uals who are interested in wrat is happening. Reality is thus also 
something defined by the actor, which forms the bulk of Goffman's book, 
Frame Analysis. Actually, this bock is not. about the core concerns pf 
sociology, i.e. social organization and social structure, but about the 
organization of experience 	 something that an individual actor can 
take into his mind' (Goffman, 1974: 13). Every individual feces the 
problem of 'what is it that is going on'. To answer this question 
people apply frameworks. Applying these frameworks can make experience 
vulnerable. Indeed, it is possible that an actor can misframe events. 
Reality is thus an outer happening independent of the individual 
actor, but it also gets its meaning from the involved individuals, 
although they are using pregiven frameworks, keyings, etc. to look at 
it. 
While Goffman takes reality as it is given to him, Alfred Schutz 
starts from the experience that we are put into the world and that we 
are intentionally directed toward the world. We are aware of the world 
around us. We fear for, hope and we long for something. This way we 
11. 
meet our world and realize that it is a pregiven, organized, and 
intersubjective reality. But as a thinking subject we are aware of the 
act of thinking and consider the 'purified sphere of conscious life'. 
Therefore, Schutz applies phenomenological reduction to the objects of 
thinking, i.e., he puts the existence of the outer world between 
brackets. He abstracta from the possibility that the world. could be 
otherwise than as it appears to us. Schutz is not interested in the 
objects as such, but in the objects as they appear to him (Schutz, 1967: 
99-117), so he does not deny the existence of the world, but his inter-
est is rather in the meaning of the world. 
Schutz adapts a point of view totally different from Goffman's in 
these matters. If Goffman's (1981b: 69) admission that he himself is 
moving toward positivism can be considered to be the correct formulation 
of what he wants to say, than he does not bracket the existence of 
reality. Schutz, on the contrary, secs reality as it appears to him. 
According to Schutz (1967: 208-229, 3-34), as scientists we have to 
go back to the prescientific reality i.e., the reality that seems 
self-evident to men remaining within the naturel attitude. For Schutz 
this is, the reality of the everyday life-world, i.e., 'that province of 
reality which the wide-awake and normal adult simply takes for granted 
in the attitude of common sense' (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974: 3). 
As wide-awake adults we experience this world as pregiven, inter-
subjective, and not created by ourselves, except for a small part. This 
life-world is not considered to be composed of merely materie" objects, 
but also of 'meaning strata which transform natura' things into culture' 
objects'. 
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This everyday life-world is nevertheless more than the sensibly 
perceivable world, which was designated by William James as the para-
mount reality. This life-world also embraces my fantasies, and dreams, 
so it is more than the physical world. Reality is thus constituted by 
the meaning of our experience rather than by the ontological structures 
of objects. We have different finite provinces of meaning: that of the 
everyday life-world, of the world of dreams, of the world of science, 
etc., which worlds are not necessary consistent. Each of these 
provinces is part of a specific style of lived experience, i.e., a 
cognitive style. In the same day, we can change from one province of 
meaning to the other. But for Schutz, the everyday life-world or 'the 
world of working' is the paramount reality from which we start to coma 
to scientific knowledge. In this world, purposes-at-hand determine the 
relevancy of the reality under consideration: it is this way that we,  
build up a particular province of meaning. According to Schutz we 
approach reality by looking at it from different 'frames'. 
Like Schutz Garfinkel (1967: 35) stresses reality as a social 
reality. In his view, people trea.t 'the naturel facts of life' as 'a 
real world and as a product of activities in a real world'. This 
starting point for the analysis of social reality is the analysis of the 
attitude of daily life as described by Schutz. Thus he agrees with 
Schutz' presupposition that for the actor 'the objects of the world are 
what they appear to be' (Garfinkel, 1963: 210-214). But this social 
reality is not just out there. Indeed, the characteristics of the real 
society are to a certain extent produced by the persons. Meaning is 
furnished by creative actors (Garfinkel, 1963: 214-215; 1967: 122, 
53-56). For the ethnomethodologist this is a paradox, but it does not 
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rasse special problems. He should be indifferent toward the problem of 
choosing between reality as out there or in people's minde Indeed, 
Leiter (1980: 20-21) contends that ethnomethodology brackets the exis-
tence of the outer world, as Schutz does. 
Contrary to Schutz and Garfinkel, Blumer's (1969: 21-23) position 
does not relt' on the intentionality of our thinking. For him, the 
exterior world of gestures and acts is reality. We see people indicat-
ing things and we understand the meaning of these gestures. Perception 
is a necessary condition of finding meaning in the world, and this 
perception is not just a product of a single actor but is an interplay 
between the individual and social environment. 
Blumer takes an empirical standpoint: reality exists only in the 
empirical world. For this reason, he rejects traditional idealism and 
realism and cannot accept that reality exists just in human pictures or 
conceptions of it. The empirical world can talk back; it is not just 
something living in our mind. Nor does this obdurate quality of reality 
produce an extreme realism. This is impossible because the reality 
and for Blumer this is social reality 	 cannot be fixed or immutable 
and so it is not to be studied as would the advanced physical sciences. 
In conclusion, it can be said that Goffman defends a positivistic 
position: reality is there for him as researchar. And he accepts that 
every actor acts as if there ware a correspondence between his percep-
tion and the organization of what is perceived (Goffman, 1974: 26). 
Instead of using the label T positivism', as Goffman does, it is perhaps 
betten to speek of naive realism. Blumer (1969: 68-69) on the other 
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hand, although speaking of an obdurate reality, states that objects are 
real in the sense that people have Biven meaning to them. Schutz does 
not deny reality but puts it between brackets. This means,that because 
of phenomenological reduction, an actor looks for the images he bas in 
his mindo But there toe, he producer a special epoché: a bracketing of 
the naturel attitude. An actor brackets the fact that the real world is 
different from the way it appears to him (Schutz, 1967: 229; Schutz and 
Luckmann, 1974: 27). Garfinkel's standpoint can be considered to be the 
same as that of Schutz. Although the four paradigms propose a different 
position in relation to reality, none of them held that reality is 
totally created by people: it is pre-Biven. 
If reality is seen from different standpoints, the ways to be 
followed to attain knowledge are different as welf. What different 
options are taken? 
Since Goffman (1974: 10) sees his talk as describing the 'frame-
works of understanding available in our society for making sense out of 
events' and 'the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of 
reference are subject', he is convinced that, as a researcher, he can 
unveil the concealed reality. Let us take `fabrication' (Goffman, 1974: 
83-113). One of the partjes involved in a fabrication are brought to a 
false belief about what it is that is going en. The fabricating party 
knows that it is a fabrication. What is hidden for the deceived party 
is not only perceivable for the fabricators but also for the researcher. 
But is it not possible that the total act of the two parties is a benign 
fabrication for the researcher? This may be, but ultimately the sociol-
ogist wil' see it. Goffman seems to defend the classic positivistic 
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stance: 'What I see, I see'. A researcher considers himself the 
ultimate judge, able to catch social reality. Just as Goffman supposes 
that there is a correspondence between the perception of an individual 
and the organization of what is perceived, he holds that a researcher 
can perceive reality the way it is. 
Blumer, on the other hand, puts himself somewhere between an 
extreme idealism and a realism that has its roots in physical science. 
Thus, experience is the ultimate criterion of knowledge because of the 
obdurate character of reality. A sociologist must perceive social and 
material reality (reed from all theoretical presupposition, and his 
starting point must be perception of outer reality. Even if this 
perception is a social act, which means that it is a concatenation of 
defining processes made by different actors, Blumer holds that the actor 
as well as the researcher has to come to the knowledge of the same 
reality. 
The option taken by Schutz to attain knowledge differs from those 
of Goffman and Blumer. Schutz brackets the possibility of experiencing 
the world. His starting point is the everyday life-world of the situated 
person, who meers that world as organized and intersubjective. In this 
everyday life-world, we act and meet the other in face-to-face rela-
tions. That is the place where I meet my fellow-men ('Mitmensch'). But 
in many situations, I meet only a 'world of contemporaries' ('Mitwelt'). 
The only way to grasp this 'Mitwelt' is to use typifications of inter-
actions and motives that are built up by using 'in-order-to' and 
'because'-motives, which are reciprocal between the actor and the 
partner. 
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Like a partner, a scientific observer does not experience the other 
as an actor does in his everyday life-world: he is a disinterested 
observer (Schutz, 1967: 245-259). As an observer, he does-Knot live in a 
we-relation and cannot immediately grasp this life-world. To bridge 
this gap, the observer builds types, poppets, that are compatible with 
the experience of the everyday life-world. He builds ideal types that 
have meaning adequacy and causal adequacy (Schutz, 1932: 260-261). To 
accomplish this, Schutz applies the postulate of subjective interpreta-
tion, the postulate of consistency and compatibility of all proposi-
tions, the postulate that all scientific thought bas to be based on 
tested observation, the postulate of clarity and distinctness of all 
terms, the postulate of adequacy, and several others. 
Garfinkel on the other hand takes most of his inspiration from 
Schutz' work, so he disagrees with Goffman and Blumer as welf in rela-
tion to the question of how to attain knowledge of sociaJ. reality. The 
experience of daily life of the actor is the main starting point for 
Garfinkel as for Schutz. The actor behaves in the world as if he grasps 
it immediately and as 'known in common with ethers'. To attain this 
common-sense knowledge, the actor ases several presuppositions 
(Garfinkel, 1963: 210-215), i.e. the reality of the world as it appears 
to be, the practical interest of the actor, the time perspective of 
daily life, the et cetera assumption, the continuity of appearances, the 
commonly entertained scheme of communication, the reciprocity of per-
spectives and the ferm of sociality. And Garfinkel continues by defin-
ing eleven determinations to see an event as placed in a common-sense 
environment. Nevertheless, actors have not to be conscious of these 
determinants. Indeed, the more an event is institutionalized the more 
the actor takes the act for granted. 
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According to Garfinkel (1963: 76-103) this common-sense knowledge 
is also a substantial part of sociologica) research. He contends that 
the sociologist doing research relies on and cannot decideKabout meaning 
or facts than by using common-sense knowledge of social structures. On 
the other hand, scientific knowledge does not suffice for action in 
everyday life, because scientific theorizing develops according to other 
principles (Garfinkel, 1963: 283). 
CONCEPTION OF MAN AND SOCIETY 
Another part of the world picture dealt with by sociologists and 
other social scientists is the conception they have about man and 
society. Depending en the vision they have of man as, for example, a 
bunch of nerves or as meaning-creating actor or of society as a unity in 
its own right or a collection of individuals, different methodological 
approaches are developed in sociology. 
Man is considered by Goffman to be a personal ongoing identity, 
consisting of flash, blood, etc. (i.e. his animal nature). Thus, man is 
a huwen actor, who stores information in his skull. But this does not 
meen that he is just a bleek box (Goffman, 1974: 524, 513-514). Placed 
into time development, he is the self-same object that has a memory and 
a biography (Goffman, 1974: 128). As a person, he fulfills many 
functions or capacities, i.e. roles. Indeed, Goffman differentiates 
between the person (individual, plager) and the role (capacity, func-
tien). Although a personis acts are partly a product of his self -- and 
we can find something of the self behind the roles -- this does not maan 
that a person has no freedom. The individual can choose between the 
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total range of actions that are available in fulfilling his role. 
Moreover, the claims of the role can be forgotten by the individual 
actor, e.g., when a person leaves a conversation to answer the tele-
phone, or when he is sniffling, coughing, etc., which is not really a 
part of his role in a conversation (Goffman, 1974: 273). In this sense, 
there is never complete freedom nor complete constraint between the 
individual and his role. The individual acting upon and in the world 
becomes part of the ongoing world and cannot be studied independently of 
that social world. A reduction of social reality to its component parts 
is, therefore, unacceptable. 
Society, although consisting of intelligent actors able to act upon 
the world, must be seen as situated in a naturel order. There are 
natural constraints within which an actor hes to behave in society, 
e.g., we need a voice to speek and a body to make gestures. Goffman's 
assumption is 'that, although naturel events occur without intelligent 
intervention, intelligent doing cannot be accomplished effectively 
without entrance into the natural order' (Goffman, 1974: 23). Conse-
quently, the actor needs two kinds of understanding: 1) the understand-
ing of the natural world by which he is encompassed, and 2) the under-
standing of the special worlds. For this understanding, actors use 
primary frameworks, both natural and social. This does not simply maan 
that individuals are merely passive users of the given frameworks. They 
also can act upon the world. But they act within a world that is 
framed, keyed, or fabricated. 'Framed t means that there happens to be 
an t organization of experienceT that is given to us. By keying or 
fabricating, the original framework is transposed or transformed. For 
example, when two people play checkars, they have to follow the rules of 
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the game that are pre-given. The same happens when these frameworks are 
keyed or fabricated. E.g., contests are a kind of keying of social 
reality. Wrestling seems to be fighting, but the rules of,the sport of 
wrestling put limits on the agressive acts. Although keying and fabrica-
tion meen a change of the meaning of particular frameworks as seen by 
the participants, they are given structure to the keying or fabricating 
astors. Here, Goffman de.scribes emerging realities that differ from the 
individual construction of reality. These structures are independent of 
the participants, but, nevertheless, it must be stressed that the 
participants are aware of the alteration of meaning. 
From Goffman's earlier work, it can be confirmed that he considers 
man and society as real. Since The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life (1959), he has adopted both sociologica) nominalism and sociolog-
ica) realism. The analysis of man, although using different concepts, 
consolidate this opinion. He speaks about 'human' and 'socialized' 
selves (Goffman, 1959: 56), about ifabricator' and Tcharacter t (Goffman, 
1959: 251-254; 1967: 31), cash being an active and passive part of the 
individual. 
This individual must be studieti as part of society, meeting in 
social encounters, social gatherings, social situations, and social 
occasions (Goffman, 1967: 44, 144; 1961a: 9; 1963b: 248). All these 
factors are strong socialization instruments. They are so important 
that Goffman (1963b: 248) concludes at the end of Behavior in Public  
Places that 
More than to any family or club, more than to any class or sex, 
more than to any nation, the individual belongs to gatherings, and 
he had best show that he is a good member in good standing. 
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For this reason, the interpretation by Helle (1977: 165) of 
Goffman's work as an 'anaskopic' approach cannot be accepted, although 
it can perhaps be defended for the earlier work of Goffman,, in which the 
definition of the situation takes an important place. It certainly is 
no langer the standpoint of Goffman when he analyzes the organization of 
social reality. Sociological realism and sociological nominalism are 
methodologically translated into an t anaskopicl and vkataskopic' 
approach. 
Discussing the methodological consequences of the conception of 
reality, I stressed above that, in phenomenological sociology, the main 
experience we have as actors is the intentianality of the individual 
actor. We do not ask for evidence about the fact that we are placed in 
an organized, intersubjective everyday life-world. We have knowledge-
at-hand of this life-world. My fellow-men are immediately given in my 
work and communication in the world. Through our communication, we not 
only become conscious of the other, but also of our own characteristics. 
To reach others in face-to-face relations, a stock af knowledge is 
given, and, to the eitent we are remote from others, we use a stock of 
knowledge equipped with idealizations, i.e., types of what the others 
want to do. These are eXpressed in linguistic typifications and recipes 
for behavior that are given to us by our predecessors. The others, like 
the actor, are purpose-directed individuals who can act upon the world. 
As an individual I am aware of the social dimension of my life-
world, i.e., a society that transcends myself. This is the basis of an 
'objective' order, an order that is given to me. To this objective 
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order belongs my subjective 'meaning-context' as well as 'my subjective-
ly experienced adumbrations and modes of apprehension' (Schutz and Luck-
mann, 1974: 18). 
It is in this social world that a personal self is developed. This 
happens when a child gets a personal self. Since a child is situated in 
a social life-world, he comes to an 'intersubjective mirroring'. He 
meets a world-structure that is pre-given and not invented by him and 
that appears to him as institutionalized and encompassed in a meaning-
context. This meaning-context is objectivized in speech and institu-
tions, which are the instruments by which a child can become a fellow-
man. There is an historical and social structure, that is met by this 
child 'here and now' (Schutz and Luckma2295, 244), Institutions 
(e.g. language, meaning-context) are an important part of the social 
world and,provide knowledge about social reality that transcends the 
possibilities of individual experience. 
Nonetheless, society is composed of individuals who experience 
society as a pre-given structure. Society must be conceived as a priori 
to the individual. Like Goffman, he recognizes the emergent character 
of the world structure. Nevertheless, Schutz does not agree that it is 
methodologically possible to know social reality without taking into 
account individual intentionality. 
Garfinkel speaks about man and society almost the same way Schutz 
does. A person is a motivational type, equipped with a body, which is 
used to designace meaning to the environment and also to draw meaning 
from others (Garfinkel, 1956: 420-421; 1967: 104-185). As a human actor 
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with a biography he is intentionally directed to the world. He uses 
seen but unnoticed background expectancies' as a scheme of interpreta-
tien of the social world that is given to him as a social system 
(Garfinkel, 1963, 1967). The individual has an intersubjective orienta-
tion toward this social world which is an organized reality, a system of 
rule-governed activities. These social structures of everyday activi-
ties become. observable through the study of common-sense knowledge and 
cammon-sense activities (Garfinkel, 19671 35-75). Doing this kind of 
research, Garfinkel, like Schutz, opts for en approach from the individ-
ual. Most of the experiments presented in his main work describe how 
persons handle common sense knowledge. Even if this common-sense 
knowledge is known by the researcher through the individuals, it is not. 
considered to be merely a product of the individual but an emergent 
reality. Structure is also part of Garfinkers (1963: 188) analysis to. 
the extent that it is a perceived normal environment, which is a condi 
tien for understanding accounts and at the same time defined by the 
attitude of daily lila. 
Man, according to Blumer, is a human organism beving a self. And 
this self is not a structure but a process. By this point of view 
Blumer (1969: 62-64; 78-89) follows Mead's conception of man, and he 
also agrees with Mead's social behavioristic approach to man. An 
individual can wake gestures, external acts, that acquire a meaning in 
the interaction with himself and the other individuals. The first thing 
a self does is designate objects and acts; he gives theet a meaning and 
judges if these objects and acts are suitable for his subsequens 
actions. Having made the judgement, he decides how to act. Because the 
individual can indicate something to himself, he has the possibility of 
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interpreting the characteristics of the situation in which he acts. The 
individual becomes a very active unity, and not just a bunch of reac-
tions. Consequently, it makes no sense for Blumer to look,for environ-
mental pressures, stimuli, motives, etc. that precede the act as an 
explanation for the act. What is important is to know that the individ-
ual constructs reality in a process of symbolic interaction and that the 
individual forms interpretations and acts in relation to others. 
This interacting self is the kernel of all ongoing activity. An 
individual meeting another individual in social interaction is the most 
fundamental form of human association. Human groups consist of inter-
acting human beings. As a matter of fact, these interacting human 
beings are not interacting 'roles', but interacting 'people'. Society 
is thus nothing but a collection of interacting individuals. 
In spite of the stress on the individual as the composing factor of 
society, Blumer does not deny the existence of a social structure in 
human society. There are social roles, positions, rank order, bureau-
cratie organizations, social codes, norms, etc. Their function is to 
help the intarpretation and definition of the situations that are at the 
base of 'joint actions'. If people do not take into account these 
structures, then the ongoing activity hes no meaning at all. But even 
these social structures have no life apart from the definition Biven by 
the individuals, even in 'joint actions'. 
Society can be characterized as follows: 1) it is an 'ongoing 
process of action - not ... a posited structure of relations'; 2) 
actions must be seen as joint interactions, not as separate actions of 
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the participants; 3) actions have a career or history; 4) the common 
definition of the joint action by the participants keeps this career 
fixed; 5) but this does not meen that this career has no uncertainties 
and possibilities. 
Blumer clearly presents a nominalistic interpretation of society. 
Although he.recognizes the existence of a social structure, his emphasis 
is on the paramount meaning of the individual. Take, for example, the 
'joint interactions' such as a marriage ceremony or a family dinner. It 
is not considered to be possible to achieve joint interaction without 
the interpretation given by the individuals of a way they fit together. 
The four paradigms stress the process character of man and society. 
Nonetheless, they assige different places to man and society in the 
saaie' reality and, as wil' be shown later, this will have different 
consequences for their methodological principles. Although none of them 
deny the existence of social structures, Goffman's frame analysis 
delivers the most structuralist approach of the three. Structure and 
society are more than the mere sum of the individuals. Schutz and 
Garfinkel also recognize this standpoint, but methodologically they turn 
back to the individual, as does Blumer. 
THE SUBJECT VATTER OF SOCIOLOGY 
Sociologists confine the subject matter of research within their 
frames of the conceptions about reality, man, and society. In genera', 
it is showt that the interest of the four has been in the ongoing social 
reality and the meaningful character of this reality. Thus it could be 
expected that the definition of sociology would present, to a certain 
extent, the same characteristics. Goffman (1974: 564) states that: 
The first object of social analysis ought..e to be ordinary actual 
behavior its structure and its organization. 
Schutz (1976: 248) puts it this way: 
The primary task of this science (interpretive sociology) is to 
describe the processas of meaning establishment and meaning inter-
pretation as these are carried out by individuals living in the 
social world. 
It must be stressed that Schutz (1967: 226) considers the iworld of 
working' as the paramount reality. Action is thus part of it. 
Garfinkel (1967: 11), although speaking about ethnomethodology, makes a 
similar point: ethnomethodology is 'the investigation of the rational 
propertjes of indexje' expressions and other practical actions as 
contingent ongoing accomplishment of organized artful practices of 
everyday life'. Blumer (1969: 55) moreover, gives a similar descrip-
tion: 
In a valid sense social action is the primary subject matter of 
social science. Hence, an accurate picture and onderstanding of 
social, action is of crucial importance. 
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Taking into account what has been said about the visions of reali-
ty, man, and society, it is normal that the three paradigms would try to 
grasp daily social action. But the option of Goffman is,, nevertheless, 
different: for him, the main task of sociology is to study the social 
structure and social organization of actual behavior. Nonetheless, 
frame analysis is not about social organization, but rather about the 
structure of experience. Even if Goffman (1974: 13) puts society first, 
he is concerned about the l individual's current involvement'. But frame 
analysis also has something to say about the structure of social action. 
With regard to three or four performing individuals, frame analysis can 
show 1) 'the tracks or channels of activity', 2) 'the laminations' and 
3) 'the participation status' (Goffman, 1974: 564-565). So the focus is 
on social structure (Goffman, 1974: 247): 
Emphasizing the organiiation of ordinary actual behavior as the 
subject matter of sociology is not new for Goffman. Even when in his 
earlier work he gives much attention to social psychology, there is 
always an important part devoted to the organizational approach of 
social action (e.g. Goffman, 1967: 2; 1961a,b; 1963b: 156, 193, 231; 
1971: X,. 63, 138, 362; 1981a: 84). For this reason, a formal sociolog-
ioal approach in the footsteps of Simmel is not unusual (Goffman, 1959: 
15; 1967: 16, 63, 65). 
However, in Frame Analysis, Goffman's main concern is not the 
structure of social life, but the structure of experience. The problem 
which he wants to solve is what happens when an individual wonders what 
is it that is going on. To solve this problem, our perceptien is 
focused by the different frames, keys, and fabrications. The actor thus 
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interprets the world using pre-given frames such as postulates, rules, 
lores of understanding, and approaches (Goffman, 1974: 21). This can be 
seen as the basis for a sociology of knowledge. 
From this point of view there is a parallel between Goffman's 
paradigm and the three others. The study of knowledge is also a central 
point in Schutz', Garfinkel's and Blumer's work. The farmer two are 
interested in the processes of meaning establishment and interpretation, 
while the letter is involved in objects, social action, and joint 
interaction as defined by the actors. 
The main part of Schutz' work (1932; 1967; 1964; 1975; 1974) is 
devoted to the phenomenological analysis of the life-world with much 
attention being given to the knowledge of the life-world and society. 
It is to be noted that this is not the same as an empirical sociology of 
knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974: 317-318), but 'the formal types of 
the social distribution of knowledge can even have a certain heuristic 
value for the empirical sociology of knowledge', As pointed out above, 
the life-world stock of knowledge, the social stock of knowledge, and 
scientific knowledge meet each other through the postulate of adequacy 
(Schutz, 1967: 44). Schutz considers this as a guarantee for the 
consistency of the constructs of the sociologist with common-sense 
knowledge (2). 
Garfinkel's ethnomethodology can also be typified as a sociology of 
common-sense knowledge. Although he takes Schutz' opinion as a starting 
point, he changes the methods of research by using experiments. In this 
way, he shows that sociologists as well as lay people use common-sense 
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knowledge to explain social reality (Garfinkel, 1967: 31, 66-103). Re 
points out that scientific rationalities cannot replace common-sense 
knowledge; they can even hinder social interaction (Garfinkel, 1967: 
277-283). Ethnomethodology can help in this way to eipose the common-
sense reasoning in sociological research. 
Blumer (196(1: 55-56), finally, although he is interested in social 
action as constructed by the participants, looks for procesces of know-
ledge: 
In this situation, he !the actorl notes, interprets and assesses 
things with which he has to deal in order to act. ... The 
collectivity is in the same position as the individual in having to 
cope with a situation, in having to interpret and analyze the 
situation, and in having to construct a line of action. 
Basically put, it means that in order to trest and analyze social 
action one has to observe the process by which it is constructed. 
One last comment is related to the general label 'micro-sociolog-
ical paradigma'. Only Garfinkel's work is confined to the study of 
face-to-face relations or small groups, which is the core subject of 
micro-sociology. Goffman speaks about such things as riots, colleges, 
passengers, and structures; Schutz about social collectives and arti-
facts; and Blumer about social structures and joint action. Why are 
these four paradigma then considered to be micro-sociological? A common 
characteristic of the four is that in each the analysis of social action 
starts with the interpreting individuals acting in relation to each 
other in small units. Because of this starting point, these approaches 
can be considered micro-sociological. 
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METHODOLOG I CAL PR I NC I FLES 
Speaking about reality and the subject matter, I argued that the 
four paradigms are keenly intarested in daily knowledge. In all of 
them, individuals are considered to be meaning-endowed entities. As a 
consequence, it could be expected that they would apply an interpretive 
sociology to a certain extent, i.e,, they would look for the aims, 
Mmtives, or plans of the actors as the means of understanding social 
action. 
It is accepted by the fOur paradigms that acting individuals have 
life plans, expectations, wishes, etc. Explaining social reality, 
consequently supposes an interpretive approach. This is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition. While Schutz (1932: 247-285), Garfinkel 
(1967), and Blumer (1969: 60, 40, 58) reduce the methods of sociology to 
an understanding of the acting individuals within a social setting, 
Goffman (1974: 10-11) does not consider this approach as sufficient: 
I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance 
with principles of organization which govern events - at least 
social ones - and our subjective involvement in them. 
Frames, keys, and fabrications organize our experience in a partic-
ular way. They are given to the actors, who do not even have to be 
aware of the primary frameworks they use. Although they may use them 
improperly, they can apply them effectively. Primary frameworks are, 
indeed, the central part of the culture of the group. In this respect, 
frameworks enable the astor to understand his world (Goffman, 1974: 
21-27). Goffman stresses a situational 'verstehen'. 
30. 
Indeed in his earlier work the idea of 'definition of the situa-
tion' takes a centra' position. Nevertheless, already in The Presenta-
tion of Self in Everyday Life (1959: 254-255) he denies ,that social 
reality is just a construction by individuals. Even if an individual 
wants to present an untrue picture of himself, he is using real tech-
niques. Consequently, it would be wrong to confine the explanation of 
social reality to. the individual definition of the situation. For that 
reason, contrary to the classical pragmatic standpoint, he stresses that 
'the meaning of an object, no doubt, is generated through its use, as 
pragmatists say, but ordinarily not by particular users' (Goffman, 1974: 
39), a remarkably different standpoint from those of Schutz and Blumer. 
What are the consequences of these points of view for methodolog-
ical research principles? 
SCIENTI7IC REASONING 
Philosophy of science has designed the different patterns of 
reasoning that are followed or have to be followed in scientific re-
search. Most researchers follow these patterns, although the importante 
of imagination in finding new ways is often stressed® The four para-
áigms, although not abandoning all the generally recognized scientific 
principles, give proof of and demand an important plat: for imagination. 
Schutz proposes that creativity build up ideal types, while Blumer asks 
for a creative approach to overcome the limited possibilities of tradi-
tional research patterns. Garfinkel uses verg original experiments in 
which he asks the experimenters to handle or think in deviarion from the 
background expectancies. Goffman's work is an overwhelmingly creative 
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presentation of frames, keys, and fabrications drawing on the most 
unusual sources of research, like comic strips, novels, cartoons, 
biographies, and the cinema. His originality does not lie in the fact 
that these sources are used, but in the way he uses them. 
The paradigms are different, too, as far as the general pattern of 
scientific reasoning is concerned. 
In general Goffman works very impressionistically. He follows no 
strict pattern to collect facts; he does not worry about representati-
vity of the facts; he neglects serious quantitative argumentation to 
vake general statements. The overall pattern is inductive, but he 
gathers facts rather to illustrate than to prove a generalization. 
There is no systematic falsification or verification; it is more free-
wheeling. The standpoint of Goffman (1981b: 65): 'I would have thought 
it moves me farther and farther (even further and further) in positi-
vism' cannot be considered to be an option for the systematic reasoning 
of the positivistic tesearcher. 
Frame analysis consists of a long list of frames used by people 
experiencing sacial reality. The explanation pattern used most of ten is 
explanation-by-concept (Rempel, 1965: 453-457). In the strict sense, 
this is not considered an explanation, but rather a description of the 
different charachteristics of a phenomenon. These are seen as the 
constituent elements of a phenomenon and in this sense, a kind of condi-
tion. For example, let us consider keying. A key is 
the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already 
meaningful in terms of some primary frameworks, is transformed into 
something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants 
to be something quite else. The process of transcription can be 
called keying (Goffman, 1974: 43-44). 
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This definition is preceded by a description of fighting of 
animals, which can be done playfully. A much longer description is then 
given of what keying is. It is a list of conjunctions of symptoms, that 
need to be present to have a keying. One Of these characteristics is: 
Participants in the activity are meent to know and to openly 
acknowledge that a systematic alteration is involved, one that will 
radically reconstitute what it is for them that is going on • 
(Goffman, 1974: 45). 
It does not seem to me that these participants are considered to be the 
causes of the keying. This is only a description of how people are 
supposed to look at reality when they are keying. 
The rest of the chapter, 'Keys and Keying', is spent on the defini-
tions of the different keys and on illustrating them by very disparate 
examples. Even when this list seems to provide an amazing amount of 
facts to support a particular key, it may not be forgotten that Goffman 
(1974: 15) does not consider them as proef or evidence, but merely as 
simple illustrations. 
Goffman also uses other explanation patterns, one of them being 
based on the dispositions of the acting individuals when they construct 
fabrications (1974: 87 ff). E.g. 'Playful deceit', 'benign fabrica-
tion', is possible because the victim accepts in goed sport to be 
deceived for a short time. 
Nevertheless, the interest of frame analysis is mostly in the 
questions of 'how and 'what' and less in the question of 'why'. This 
is not a very unusual practica for the author, as John Lofland (1980: 
31-37) has showt in analyzing the earlier work of Goffman. 
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The standpoint of phenomenological sociology is different. This 
sociological paradigm wants to observe and understand the life-world. 
It explicitly chooses a subjective interpretation. This means that the 
explanation must take account of the actor, not as seen by the re-
searcher, but by the actor himself (postulate of subjective interpre-
tation). As I mentioned above, the sociologist, being an objective 
observer, has to build ideal types. By these ideal types, the act of 
the actor can be understood by the researcher. It can also be under-
stood by the actor and his fellow-men since the act occurs in their 
life-world (postulate of adequacy). An ideal type must be constructed 
like the typifications used in the everyday life-world. Moverover, an 
ideal type, as Weber has put it, must be both causa' and meaning-ade-
quate. So it is not sufficient that the motives have some meaning for 
the realization of the typical act, there must also be some evidence 
that a meaning-adequate type has same chance of occurring, as experience 
shows (Schutz, 1932: 247-285). Empirical observation is consequently 
the basis for verification. 
Garfinkel (1967: 77-79) also stresses observation, but uses inter-
pretation or the documentary methods (Mannheim) and experiments. This 
documentary method takes an 'actual appearance as 'the ddcument of', as 
'pointing to', as 'standing on behalf of' a presupposed underlying 
pattern'. This actual appearance is interpreted within the common-sense 
knowledge of social structures. Indeed, social facts, which the re-
searcher gets within accounts or ethnographies, are indexical and 
reflexive. These two characteristics are conditions for interpretation. 
Garfinkel goes even further. He uses the documentary method to find how 
understanding happens in daily events. Therefore he uses experiments. 
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Most of the experiments start with a stable system and Garfinkel (1963; 
1967: 36-38) tries than to create trouble by asking experimenters to act 
deviantly. The aim is to show how persons interpret the,new deviant 
situation in order to learn what they consider to be the normcel. struc-
ture. Garfinkel is firmly convinced that these are not proper experi-
ments, but a kind of documentary method to aid his imagination. They 
are seen more as a source of illustration than as a proof for a thesis. 
Causality is not the main concern of Garfinkel; he is more interested in 
how meaning is Biven to social reality. 
On the other hand, symbolic interactionism explicitly takes an 
inductive stance. The classic patterns of research, the traditional 
testing of hypotheses, and the confinement to operational procedures are 
rejected because of their stereotyped structures. A researcher bas to 
return to the empirical social world, i.e., 'the actual group life of 
human beings' (Blumer, 1969: 35). Hence the researcher must bridge the 
distance between his life-world and that of the studied group. There-
fore, it would be best for the researcher to become a participant of the 
group. Doing research means that two steps are taken. In the first 
place, there is 'exploration', which means that the researcher adapts 
questions and methods to the interpretation made by the life-group. In 
the second place, there is 'inspection': the task of scrutinizing the 
relationship between analytical elements (i.e. general or categorical 
items) and empirical reality. This method, as formulated by Blumer 
(1969: 21-47), forms an inductive sociology using facts to build up 
theoretical propositions. For Blumer (1969: 30), this includes confir-
mation as well as falsification. 
have contended that the paradigms take different methodological 
stances according to their ontological options, and I suggested that 
scientific reasoning would follow these differences. 
Goffman's frame analysis has a peculiar position in relation to 
this problem. 1f we agree that he is moving closer to positivism 
(Goffman, 1981b: 65), it could be expected he would pay more attention 
to inductive thinking. And, in a certain sense, he does, but the main 
thrust of his argument is an enumeration of concepts and illustrations 
that can be used to recognize structures. 
THEORY 
Theory is a very ambiguous concept in methodology. It can be 
considered as a universal proposition explaining facts, or as a law, an 
hypotheses, or something in between. The function of theory is also 
variously defined. This makel it difficult to give an assessment of 
whether frame analysis, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology or 
phenomenological sociology have attained theory statusra Here I would 
only ask: What is theory according to the three paradigms? 
If more attention in Frame Analysis is paid to explanations-by-
concept, it might be expected that little would be said of laws and 
theoriesi Nonetheless, Goffman (1974: 14) wants 'to construct general 
statements', which was not his aim in Relations in Public (1971: XIV). 
Here he does not want to produce absolute or statistica) generaliza-
tions. He prefers to speek about practices occuring iroutinely', 
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?aften' or ion occasion'. Moreover he is aware that his analysis is 
confined to Western society, and - more particularly to Anglo-American 
society, in which he pays more attention to middle class behavior 
(Goffman, 1961b: 182; 1963b: 5; 1971: XIV, 40, 75, 382; 1974: 521-522) 
than to any other category® He does not deny class differences 
(Goffman, 1961e: 50; 1963b: 206), but it is not his primary intention to 
contribute to class analysis (Goffman, 1974: 14). 
Ralying on a vast number of illustrations and his creative analyti-
cal pover, he makes many general statements in Frame Analysis. For 
example, 
When the individual in our Western society recognizes a particular 
event, he tends, whatever esse he does,--tó imply in this response 
(and in effect employ) one or more frameworks or schemata of inter-
pretation of a kind that can be called primary (Goffman, 1974: 21). 
When no keying is involved, when, that is, only primary perspec-
tives apply, response in frame terms is not likely unles.s doubt 
needs combatting, as in the reply: 'No, theyi re not merely playing; 
it's a real fight (Goffman, 1974: 46). 
The more vulnerable the dominant participant to deviant subordinate 
response, the more selection apparently there is in regard to sub-
ordinates (Goffman, 1974: 429). 
When more generalizations have accumulated concerning face-to-face 
interaction, there will be greater resources to draw upon for 
intentionally unhinging the frame of ordinary events (Goffman, 
1974: 495). 
Statements of this kind are numerous, also in the eerlier work 
(Lonend, 1980: 33-34), but they are rarely the product of a systematic 
collection of corroborating facts. 
As totality, however, frame analysis seems to wake the general 
statement that, as a tule, individuals use a mixture of classified 
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frames. Even though the list of frames is not exhaustive, all of us use 
them when aaswering the question of what it is that is going on. 
According to phenomenological sociology, theory is one of the main 
concerns of a sociologist. Theory means: 
the explicit formulation of determinate relations between a set of 
variades in terms of which a fairly extensive class of empiri-
cally ascertainable regularities can be explained (Schutz, 1967: 
52). 
The universality and the predictive value of these thecries is 
resther restricted. But even though these generalizations have their 
limitations, they do have a certain nomothetic value. Ideal types are, 
indeed, constructed in perfect anonymity and, in this way, teil how this 
typical actor acts in general. 
Because the scientifically ideal types must be built in conformity 
with everyday and social stock of knowledge, Schutz (1967: 59) considers 
it necessary to detect the general principles by which an actor grasps 
his everyday life-world. For this reason, all the general statements 
made in relation to the knowledge of the life-world and society are of 
importance for constructing a sociological theory (Schutz and Luckmann, 
1974). 
Symbolic interactionism is as vutspoken as phenomenological sociol-
ogy. Blumer (1969: 140) sees the purpose of theory as the development 
of analytical schemes of the empirical world. But theory has too long 
been considered to be a result of empirical research with no notice 
being given to the way empirical facts are approached in inquiry. It 
must be seen as a result of a dialectical process: 
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Theory, inquiry and empirical fact are interwoven in a texture of 
operations with theory guiding inquiry, inquiry seeking and 
isolating facts, and facts affecting theory (Blumer, 1969)  141). 
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For this reason the empirical reality must be stressed and concepts 
must be reconsidered in close relation with reality: 'sensitizing! 
concepts have to be used. 
Garfinkel approaches classical sociological theory as critically as does 
Blumer. He borrows from Schutz for his analysis, but expands the 
methods. He refuses to accept that common sense knowledge and activi 
ties are just assumed, but raakes it an issue of inquiry. He shows that 
a sociological researchei or theorist assumes common sense knowledge and 
presuppositions to explain social phenomena, to interpret answers of 
questionnaires, biographies, folders, etc. 
CONCEPTS 
Frame analysis, phenomenological sociology and symbolic interaction 
speek about concepts as the sacred instruments for research. The nature 
of these concepts differs in all three paradigms, and so their functions 
differ. 
Like Goffman t s earlier work, Frame Analysis is a brilliant con—
struct of concepts concerning the structure of experience, but it is 
more a taxonomy than a theory. As typifications of what is going en in 
daily life, these concepts are closely related to everyday language, and 
most of his definitions are illustrated by large numbers of examples. 
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For many concepts he relies on the definitions Biven by other 
authors, without always taking into account their methodological 
options. For example, 'social selves' of W. James (Goffman, 1959: 48), 
'tules of irrelevance' of E. Garfinkel, 'frame' of G. Bateson, 'socia-
bility' of G. Simmel, 'bureaucracy' of M. Weber and T. Parsons, 
'role-set' of Merton, 'role-sectors' of N. Gross and others, 'profane' 
and 'sacred' of Durkheim (Goffman, 1961a: 19, 21, 22, 87, 152), 
'eye-to-eye looks' of Simmel (Goffman, 1963b: 93), 'interchange' of E.D. 
Chapple, 'ideal sphere' and 'adventure' of Simmel (Goffman, 1967: 19, 
62, 162), 'strategie interaction' of T.C. Schelling (Goffman, 1969: 
100), 'interaction synchrony' of W.S. Condon, 'prestation' of M. Maus, 
'round' and 'exchange' of R. Sacks (Goffman, 1971: 52, 62, 119). 
Rarely does he make a comparative analysis of the concepts before 
proposing a new construct, like he does in Role Distance (1961a). 
These concepts have the farm of Weberian ideal types. Some of 
these stress the motivational aspect. This is the case for make-
believe, experiments, fabrications, and benign fabrications,- to cite 
only a few (Goffman, 1974: 48, 73, 83, 87). Other concepts concern how 
something is seen by the actors, e.g., keying, performance, cosmological 
interest, fortuitousness, and demonstration (Goffman, 1974: 43-44, 124, 
30, 33, 66). As a totality, they delineate the different perspectives 
from which social reality is met by actors in the world and describe a 
pre-given structure of the experience of daily life. 
Of ten these concepts are part of typologies, as be seen when 
frames, keys and fabrications were presented. Goffman does not consider 
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these typologies as an exhaustive description of the phenomena, but as a 
result of 'a caricature of systematic sampling'. Moreover these types 
seem to be postulates and not assertions to be proven or tested 
h 
(Lofland, 1980: 30). 
The conceptualization in phenamenological sociology develops 
directly along the litie of Weberian ideal types. T have had occasion to 
mention this above with regard to scientific reasoning and theory. 
While the homunculi (= ideal types) must be built adequate to everyday 
knowledge and to the social stock of knowledge, the significance of pre-
scientific knowledge for sociology has to be stresseden Schutz and Luck-
mann (1974: 306-331) give a goud example of this in relation to the 
study of professionalization. The types, i.e., the layman, the well-
informed, and the expert, foren an interesting starting point for furrher 
research. 
Few sociologists have so forcefully drawn attention to the mistakes 
made in the.construction and application of concepts as Blumer (1969: 
153-182). In :nis opinion, traditional empirical sociology uses concepts 
erroneously, Scientific concepts need a particular degree of abstrac-
tion, but they must be meticulously scrutinized in close relation to 
social life. For Blumer (1969: 147-148), scientific concepts are 
'sensitizing' and not 'definitive', only providing general orientations 
for the researcher. In this respect, they zake possible new orienta-
tions and new experiences in social research. 
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Like Blumer Garfinkel stresses that concepts, sentences, utter—
ances, etc. must be considered in close connection with the setting in 
which they are used. The meaning of concepts is consequently not fixed, 
but depends on the context in which they are employed. Each account 
must be interpreted taking into account the indexicality of the expres—
slons. In addition he employs ideal types as does Schutz (Garfinkel, 
1967: 106, 263). But here again, their meaning is determined by the 
context in which they are placed. Concepts are thus not just research 
instruments but are to be scrutinized. 
KET1:10DS 
In view of the different methodological standpoints of the four 
paradigms, it could be expected that their research methods would 
differ. Although, in principle, most of the usual research techniques 
are considered to be useful, there is much criticism on the conventional 
survey and experimental methods. None of the four sociologists use the 
conventional methods in the traditional way. 
If Goffman's option for positivism is taken seriously, Frame 
Analysis involves a very unorthodox approach. He ignores systematic 
gathering of data to verify hypotheses and build theories. Moreover, 
the facts used in Frame Analysis differ considerably from traditional 
sociological data. Field work, as such, is not used, although some of 
Goffman's examples come from participant observation. Instead, Goffman 
(1974: 15; 1971: XIV; 1976: 24) works with illustrations found in 
popular books, newspapers, navels, the cinema, comics, theater, etc. and 
he admits that it is 'a caricature of systematic sampling'. For this 
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reason, it does not matter whether his stories are reliable or not. This 
point of view is acceptable if the aim is to give a limited description 
of the structure of experience. If not, the selection of,the examples 
would limit the capacity of frame analysis to find all the possible 
structures. 
Goffman sees himself as an 'ethnographer of small entitiesl. Being 
a student of Lloyd Werner and E.C. Hughes, he was trained to do this 
kind of work. But the major part of his work, and certainly Frame 
Analysis, is not a product of direct observation. He performed field 
work only three times: a study of a small community on the Shetland 
Islands (Communication Conduct in an Island Community (1953), a study of 
a mental health hospital (Asylums) and an unpublished study about 
behavior in casinos. Like Frame Analysis, most of his work is relying 
on illustrations, gathered from personal experience, and the haphazardly 
collected strips of reality presented in tree or fictitious stories of 
novels, films, research reports, etc. The selection of this material 
happened 'over the years on a hit-or-miss basis using principles of 
selection mysterious to me' (Goffman, 1974: 15). Sometimes he does have 
a pattere to collect facts, like the ethology in Relations in Public  
(1971) or game theory in Strategic Interaction (1969). 
The use of ideal types in phenomenological sociology demands a 
study of the everyday life-world as it appears to the actor, and the 
main method in Schutz' work is phenomenological analysis of the life-
world of the actor. Goed examples of this are-found in his papers 'The 
Homecorner' and 'The Stranger' (Schutz, 1964: 91-119). The attempt to 
43„ 
imagine what life in everyday life-world is like seems to be the main 
research technique, and it must be augmented by empirical observation. 
e 
Garfinkel has a similar position, i.e. ethnography and accounts are 
the main methods of data collection in ethnomethodology. These phenom-
ena are approached interpretatively as seen by the members of society. 
To facilitate this approach, Garfinkel uses experiments, but in a 
totally different way than does the main tradition. In these experi-
ments, the experimenters are mostly students who are not chosen in 
function of a representative picture of the problem. Ver',  of ten they 
are not trained for the experiment and are given no clear tules to write 
the accounts. The experimenters also use interviewing, but their 
objectives are different from the conventional interview techniques. 
Even when Garfinkel counts the distribution of the phenomena, they can 
only be considered as illustrations for a particular interpretation of 
social reality; he is not concerned about the representativity of his 
material. Like Goffman, Garfinkel uses also ethnography, but, because 
of his typical ethnomethodological standpoint, the points of interest 
are completely different. 
The ongoing social life, according to the symbolic interactionist, 
cannot be grasped by classic scientific procedures, which destroy the 
possibility of getting valid information about the empirical world. The 
researcher has to come as close as possible to the object. This can be 
done by becoming am observant particpant who explores and inspects. For 
exploration all kinds of techniques are allowed such as direct observa-
tion, interviews, listening to conversations, life histories, letters 
and diaries and group discussion. The particular method to be used 
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cannot be determined in advance but has to be adapted in the course of 
the project. 
CONCLUS ONS 
The purpose of thia paper is not to evaluate the four paradigms. 
To do this properly the explainatory power of each approach to particu—
lar problems would have to be evaluated. But the works of the four 
authors are ton divergent to do this. Whether the frames analyzed in 
Frame Analysis give an adequate picture of the structures of experience 
can only be answered empirically. But this was not the aim of this 
paper. 
In spite of the specificity of the paradigms, it is obvious that 
'the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for 
making sense out of events' (Goffman, 1974: 10) are embryonically 
recognizable in Schutz' social stock of knowledge and Garfinkel's 
common—sense knowledge of social structures. The epistemological base 
is, of.course, different, but the study of structural phenomena is 
clearly part of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology. 
I have suggested that differences in the world pictures would 
reveal different methodological options. Frame analysis appears as a 
positivistically inspired reaction against the solipsism of other 
micro—sociological paradigms. Reality does not live fust in the minds 
of the knowing individuals. Reality is a given and can be recognized as 
such. Although phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology and 
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symbolic interactionism try hard to escape the label of solipsism, the 
knowing subject is undeniably the centra]. source of knowledge for these 
paradigms. 
From an ontological perspective, Goffman stresses the emergent 
character af society and the ongoing identity of man. Society and the 
individual are also assigned an important place in the sociology of 
Schutz and Garfinkel, although they bracket the existence of the world, 
white 3lumer reduces social life to the joint interaction of individu—
als. Thus, the structural approach is of centra! concern for both frame 
analysis, phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology. 
In spite of these differences the programs of the four paradigms 
are similar: they all want to study 'ongoing social action'; they all 
start from face—co—face interactions, but they do not confine the study 
to smalt groups with the exception of Garfinkel; and they develop a base 
for a sociology of everyday knowledge. 
From the methodological standpoint, there are big differences 
between frame analysis, phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology and 
symbolic interactionism. Frame analysis can be characterized as an 
approach that is more interested in answering the questions of 'how' and 
'what', rather than 'why'. Theory is reduced to generalizations that 
are formulated on the basis of a selection of illustrations. For the 
description of the different frames, a vast list af concepts is created, 
in which very often the personal motivation of the actor is considered. 
The fact gathering is haphazard, which is justified by the structural 
interest. 
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Taking into account the ontological perspectives, it is shown that 
a subjective interpretation from the standpoint of the actor is the 
concern of the three other paradigms. All three stress observation, but 
are highly critical of the conventional survey and experimental methods, 
although the arguments are different. There is no concern for represen—
tative observation; collected facts are rather illustrations. Using 
this kind of experience, Schutz and Garfinkel show the meaning of 
common—sense knowledge for scientific reasoning, Blumer is more inter—
ested in interacting individuals. Concepts are used differently. 
Schutz and Garfinkel apply ideal types, Blumer t sensitive' concepts, and 
Garfinkel pay mach attention to the meaning of concepts in relation to 
the social setting. 
Whatever the epistemological standpoint of the critic may be, it 
cannot be denied that frame analysis delivers a brilliant description of 
the structure of our experience. This structural approach was already 
present in Goffman's earlier works, although less pronouncedly. None of 
the three other paradigms has produced anything similar, although there 
is a basis for this structural approach in Schutz' analysis of the 
social stock of knowledge and Gartinkel's work. This approach is 
important because it puts structural analysis back into the study of 
smalt groups, and creates interest for frames, structures and organiza—
tions, rather than for interaction. 
Notes 
(*) This article is an expansion of the paper presented onder the same 
title at the symposium 'ReviSions and relations among modern 
micro-sociological paradigms' of the Tenth World Congress of 
Sociology, Mexico, August 1982. I am grateful tor the critical 
remarks of Joan Aldous, Karel Dobbelaere, Horst J. Helle, Tamotsu 
Shibutani and Dominique Vancraeynest. 
(1) We do not consider here the symbolic interactionism of Manford 
Kuhn, which takes different stances on various points. 
(2) The postulate of adequacy is actually a deus ex machina. Indeed, 
how is it possible, that a sociologist who approaches society as a 
'world of mere contemporaries' and never as a world of 'fellow-men' 
can ever get a picture of his fellow-men? For Schutz, the solution 
is to be found in the ideal types. 
47. 
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